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https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2015-04-20/europes-shattered-dream-order
Es largo, y estoy (humildemente) en desacuerdo con varias cosas, pero me ha resultado muy interesante.
"The Ukraine crisis has forced Europeans to face up to the fact that their political model is not attractive to everyone—and certainly not to everyone in their own neighborhood. Their shock recalls that felt by Japanese technology executives at the end of the last decade, when they realized that although they manufactured the world’s most advanced cell phones, they could not sell them abroad. Consumers elsewhere simply weren’t ready, since Japanese devices relied on advanced technologies, such as third-generation e-commerce platforms, that were not widely used in other countries. Japanese cell phones, in other words, were too perfect to succeed.
Some dubbed this phenomenon Japan’s “Galápagos syndrome,” referring to Charles Darwin’s observation that animals living in the remote Galápagos Islands, with their unique flora and fauna, had developed special characteristics not replicable elsewhere. Much the same could be said of Europe’s order today, which evolved in an ecosystem shielded from the wider world’s rougher realities—and has consequently become too advanced and too particular for others to follow."
No estoy muy de acuerdo con ello, aunque pueda haber cierta arrogancia europea en la visión del mundo no parecemos compartir la obsesión evangélico-política de EE.UU.
"Although the immediate effect of the Ukraine crisis was to bring Europe and the United States closer together, the process of formulating a response has exposed deep divisions between them. There are persistent questions, for example, about U.S. guarantees of European security, despite repeated assurances from U.S. President Barack Obama. Were Russia to support rebel forces in a NATO member—Latvia, say—how would Washington respond? There are also doubts about Washington’s attention span. At the 2015 Munich Security Conference, a senior German official complained to us that the United States is unreliable: “Because the stakes are so low for [the Americans], we never know where Washington will end up. It could escalate the sanctions and arm Ukraine now. But in a few years, it could reset the relationship to secure Russia’s cooperation on an unconnected issue, such as Islamic State.”
Pues diría que sí...y que es normal.
“The demilitarization of Europe—where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it—has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st.”
Esta frase es muy rotunda, yo no iría tan lejos ni mucho menos..pero...pero...tiene un fondo muy inquietante.
"Europe finds itself in this predicament for a simple reason: in the years leading up to the Ukraine crisis, Western governments fundamentally misread Russia. They mistook Moscow’s failure to block the post–Cold War order as support for it, assumed that Russia’s integration into the world economy would invest the country in the status quo, and failed to see that although few Russians longed for a return to Soviet communism, most were nostalgic for superpower status."
Esto puede ser muy cierto.
Y en fin; es tentador reflexionar, a la luz de artículos como este, en el trato que Europa da (damos) a los refugiados sirios, después de desentendernos de por qué deben huir. Nos hemos convertido en unas sociedades que aspiran a estar cómodas y que nada las salpique, quizá...
Es largo, y estoy (humildemente) en desacuerdo con varias cosas, pero me ha resultado muy interesante.
"The Ukraine crisis has forced Europeans to face up to the fact that their political model is not attractive to everyone—and certainly not to everyone in their own neighborhood. Their shock recalls that felt by Japanese technology executives at the end of the last decade, when they realized that although they manufactured the world’s most advanced cell phones, they could not sell them abroad. Consumers elsewhere simply weren’t ready, since Japanese devices relied on advanced technologies, such as third-generation e-commerce platforms, that were not widely used in other countries. Japanese cell phones, in other words, were too perfect to succeed.
Some dubbed this phenomenon Japan’s “Galápagos syndrome,” referring to Charles Darwin’s observation that animals living in the remote Galápagos Islands, with their unique flora and fauna, had developed special characteristics not replicable elsewhere. Much the same could be said of Europe’s order today, which evolved in an ecosystem shielded from the wider world’s rougher realities—and has consequently become too advanced and too particular for others to follow."
No estoy muy de acuerdo con ello, aunque pueda haber cierta arrogancia europea en la visión del mundo no parecemos compartir la obsesión evangélico-política de EE.UU.
"Although the immediate effect of the Ukraine crisis was to bring Europe and the United States closer together, the process of formulating a response has exposed deep divisions between them. There are persistent questions, for example, about U.S. guarantees of European security, despite repeated assurances from U.S. President Barack Obama. Were Russia to support rebel forces in a NATO member—Latvia, say—how would Washington respond? There are also doubts about Washington’s attention span. At the 2015 Munich Security Conference, a senior German official complained to us that the United States is unreliable: “Because the stakes are so low for [the Americans], we never know where Washington will end up. It could escalate the sanctions and arm Ukraine now. But in a few years, it could reset the relationship to secure Russia’s cooperation on an unconnected issue, such as Islamic State.”
Pues diría que sí...y que es normal.
“The demilitarization of Europe—where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it—has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st.”
Esta frase es muy rotunda, yo no iría tan lejos ni mucho menos..pero...pero...tiene un fondo muy inquietante.
"Europe finds itself in this predicament for a simple reason: in the years leading up to the Ukraine crisis, Western governments fundamentally misread Russia. They mistook Moscow’s failure to block the post–Cold War order as support for it, assumed that Russia’s integration into the world economy would invest the country in the status quo, and failed to see that although few Russians longed for a return to Soviet communism, most were nostalgic for superpower status."
Esto puede ser muy cierto.
Y en fin; es tentador reflexionar, a la luz de artículos como este, en el trato que Europa da (damos) a los refugiados sirios, después de desentendernos de por qué deben huir. Nos hemos convertido en unas sociedades que aspiran a estar cómodas y que nada las salpique, quizá...
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Comentarios
No creo ni que la UE vaya a tener una agenda exterior común ni mucho menos que se vaya a alejar de USA. USA sigue siendo el gendarme mundial y eso a Europa le es cómodo y le permite tener menos gasto militar. Además países como Alemania o por supuesto Reino Unido tienen relaciones muy fuertes con USA y su alianza diplomática es considerablemente más fuerte que con otros socios de la UE. Realmente las relaciones con Rusia siguen siendo una prolongación aunque descafeinada de las de la guerra fría. Además Rusia hoy por hoy ya no tiene ningún atractivo para Europa ni en el plano económico, ni en el tecnológico, ni en el político ni en el cultural.
Un saludo